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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No:  05-1854
ARLENE WINTERS,
                               Appellant
       v.
JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
                                      
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
District Court No.: 03-CV-1819
District Judge: The Honorable Terrence F. McVerry
                                          
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
October 20, 2005
Before: SMITH, BECKER, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Filed: November 3, 2005 )
                                           
OPINION
                                           
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Arlene Winters appeals from the District Court’s judgment, which affirmed the
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for disability
insurance benefits under Title II and supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Title
    The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. §1
405(g).  Appellate jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
    GAF is an acronym which refers to an individual’s score on the Global Assessment of2
Functioning Scale.  American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders, 32 (4th ed. Text Revision 2000) (hereinafter referred to as DSM-IV-
TR).  The scale is used to report the “clinician’s judgment of the individual’s overall level
of functioning” in light of his psychological, social, and occupational limitations.  Id.  The
GAF ratings range from 1 to 100.  A score of 25 means that the individual is experiencing
a “serious impairment in communication or judgment . . . or [an] inability to function in
almost all areas. . . .”   Id. at 34.  
2
XVI of the Social Security Act.   Our review “is identical to that of the District Court,1
namely to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s
decision.”  Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999).  Substantial evidence is
“more than a mere scintilla.  It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  For the reasons that follow, we
will reverse the judgment of the District Court.
Winters applied for disability insurance benefits and SSI in June of 2002.  She
alleged disability on the basis of severe depression, panic and anxiety attacks, and
agoraphobia.  These psychiatric disorders were diagnosed by Dr. Brenda Freeman in June
of 2001 after Winters was involuntarily admitted to Mercy Providence Hospital for
treatment.  At that time, Winters’s ability to function was severely compromised as her 
GAF was assessed at 25.   She responded to treatment with medications and therapy.  At2
the time of her discharge eight days later, Winters’s GAF had improved to 45, which
3indicated that she continued to experience “serious symptoms . . . or any serious
impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning. . . .”  DSM-IV-TR at 34.
Dr. Freeman continued to treat Winters after her discharge.  A progress note dated
May 3, 2002, indicated that Winters continued to experience a depressed mood, suicidal
plans, and anxiety with panic attacks.  Her GAF remained low at 40, indicating that she
had “some impairment in reality testing or communication . . . or major impairment in
several areas, such as work or school, family relations, judgment, thinking or mood. . . .” 
Id.  
A month later, Dr. Freeman completed a Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare form.  Dr. Freeman confirmed that Winters’s diagnoses were “major depression,
recurrent, severe without psychosis,” and she explained that Winters was unable to work
in any capacity without medication because of her depressive symptoms, anxiety, and a
fear of leaving her house.  Winters’s medication included Effexor and Trazadone, two
antidepressants, and Cogentin, an antiparkinsonnian drug.  Dr. Freeman checked the box
on the form which indicated that Winters was “permanently disabled” by a physical or
mental condition which precluded any gainful employment and that she was a candidate
for disability insurance benefits or SSI.  
In October of 2002, Winters was evaluated by Steven Pacella, a psychologist.  He
documented her past psychiatric history and noted that she was maintained on Effexor,
Trazadone, and Cogentin, as well as Zoloft, another antidepressant.  Winters advised Dr.
4Pacella that she did not consider herself capable of working because she “still can’t go
places.”  Pacella’s mental assessment indicated that Winters was alert, fully oriented,
appropriately responsive, non-delusional, and clear in her thinking with adequate recall. 
He opined that she was able to understand and follow instructions, had the ability to work
within a set schedule and attend to a task.  He acknowledged that Winters was “poorly
tolerant of adult stress, pressure and responsibility and seems to relate to others in an
overly-dependant manner.”
In March 2003, Dr. Freeman completed yet another form relative to Winters’s
application for disability insurance and SSI benefits.  Dr. Freeman indicated that she saw
Winters every eight weeks and that a psychiatric nurse saw her between these visits.  In
addition, Winters was seeing an individual therapist on an intermittent basis.  Her
diagnoses were unchanged and her condition was “chronic and only partially responsive
to current treatment.”   Winters’s medication regime included Celexa and Trazadone, both
of which were antidepressants, and these medications, according to Dr. Freeman, yielded
“about 50% reduction of symptoms.”  Dr. Freeman explained that Winters had been
compliant with her treatment, but that trials of the medications Effexor, Zoloft,
Wellbutrin, Vistaril, and Prozac either had resulted in severe side effects or a lack of
efficacy.  
Dr. Freeman further explained that Winters’s symptoms affected her ability to
work because she had “continued, moderate to marked panic attacks, anxiety, [and]
5depression.”  Dr. Freeman opined that Winters was unable to “work in any capacity at this
time.”  Although Dr. Freeman indicated on an accompanying form that Winters could
follow rules, use her judgment, and function independently to a degree, Dr. Freeman
documented that Winters was limited by her depressed mood, panic attacks, agoraphobia,
crying spells, passive death wishes, low self-esteem, anticipatory anxiety, and avoidant
behavior, as well as a decreased ability to concentrate.  In fact, Winters’s GAF remained
in the low-to-mid forties, and she continued to experience serious symptoms affecting her
ability to function socially and occupationally.  DSM-IV-TR at 34.  
In addition to the forms completed by Dr. Freeman concerning Winters’s ability to
work, Dr. Freeman submitted a three page psychiatric evaluation update.  Dr. Freeman
documented that Winters
reports continued symptoms of depression and anxiety.  Her mood remains
depressed with passive death wishes and without active suicidal ideations,
planned or intent to harm her self.  She feels hopeless and helpless with her
situation because of these ongoing Panic Disorder symptoms.  She has low
self-esteem and very limited support network because she has difficulty
leaving the house.  Her Panic Disorder consists of panic attacks, both
precipitated and spontaneous, and she has to plan several days before she
can go out of the house and then she needs someone with her.  She has
anticipatory anxiety and avoidant behaviors and when she does have a panic
attack she has severe anxiety, heart palpitations, nausea, feeling a lump in
her throat, fearfulness and it takes up to twenty-minutes of slow deep
diaphragmatic breathing for the attack to resolve.  She reports that during
these attacks she cannot speak and is usually unable to focus on anything
but her breathing. . . . She also does report symptoms of social phobia and
states that it is difficult for her to be around people that she does not know,
but she is trying to work on this and she is hopeful that she can begin to
attend a Woman’s Support Group here at our agency.
6Dr. Freeman opined that Winters was unable to work in any capacity because of her
depression and anxiety.  She further opined that “[a]t this point her main goal is to reduce
anxiety enough to begin attending further treatment programs at this agency.”  
Despite Dr. Freeman’s thorough evaluation, the Administrative law Judge (“ALJ”)
accorded minimal weight to Dr. Freeman’s opinion, concluding that it was contradicted
by other evidence, particularly Dr. Freeman’s report that Winters’s condition had
improved.  Although Winters challenged the ALJ’s decision, the District Court affirmed
the denial of benefits.  We will reverse.
It is well-settled that a treating physician’s opinion deserves great weight because
that opinion 
reflect[s] expert judgment based on a continuing observation of the
patient’s condition over a prolonged period of time.  An ALJ may reject a
treating physician’s opinion outright only on the basis of contradictory
medical evidence, but may afford a treating physician’s opinion more or
less weight depending upon the extent to which supporting explanations are
provided.
Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429 (internal quotations marks and citation omitted).  
As Winters’s treating physician, Dr. Freeman evaluated Winters every eight weeks
over the course of two years, carefully titrating her medications and adjusting her therapy. 
Dr. Freeman acknowledged that Winters had improved after several medication trials, but
noted that her current medication regime reduced her symptoms by only 50%.  In
addition, Winters’s agoraphobia continued to hinder her progress as she was reluctant to
leave her house, needing several days to plan any excursion.  As a result, Dr. Freeman had
7shifted the focus of Winters’s treatment to reducing her anxiety sufficiently so she could
begin to leave her home to attend further therapy on site at the agency.   Dr. Freeman’s
March 2003 report explained how Winters’s continued symptomology adversely affected
her ability to work.  Because Dr. Freeman’s detailed report was the most recent medical
evidence concerning Winters’s psychiatric status in the record and was uncontradicted, it
should not have been discounted by the ALJ.  Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429.   For that
reason, we conclude that the ALJ erred by relying on the vocational expert’s testimony
concerning Winters’s residual functional capacity inasmuch as it was based on Dr.
Pacella’s earlier report which not only failed to take into account Winters’s inability to
freely leave her home, but also did not reflect the extent of Winters’s symptomology on
her current medication regime.  See Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir.
1984) (instructing that it is error to rely on a vocational expert’s testimony if the
hypothetical does not accurately portray the individual’s physical and mental
impairments).
Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence.  We will reverse the order of the District Court, and will remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
